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HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC.:




Sexual harassment, the experience, is becoming "sexual harass-
ment," the legal claim. As the pain and stifled anger have become
focused into dissatisfaction, gripes have crystallized into a griev-
ance, and women's inner protest is becoming a cause of action. But
this is not a direct process of transliteration. Life becoming law and
back again is a process of transformation. Legitimized and sanc-
tioned, the legal concept of sexual harassment reenters the society
to participate in shaping the social definitions of what may be re-
sisted or complained about, said aloud, or even felt.'
In 1979, Catharine A. MacKinnon wrote about the increasing fre-
quency of sexual harassment in the workplace and its emergence as a
legal claim.2 In the fifteen years since, the claim of sexual harassment
has received considerable recognition both in society and the law. All
courts today recognize that sexual harassment is a form of sexual dis-
crimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
Furthermore, all courts uniformly acknowledge that sexual harass-
ment is not just the conditioning of an employment position or em-
ployment benefits on sex but also the creation of a hostile
environment that detrimentally affects a worker's employment.4 Con-
sequently, sexual harassment, the experience, has become sexual har-
assment, the legal claim.
Although sexual harassment is now an established cause of ac-
tion, the law regarding sexual harassment is still rapidly evolving for
two basic reasons. First, sexual harassment claims are highly fact-in-
tensive, so many relevant issues are determinable only on a case-by-
1. CATHARINE A. MAcKiNNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 57 (1979).
2. Id
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. 1992). See infra note 18 and accompany-
ing text.
4. IWo forms of sexual harassment have been recognized by American courts: quid pro
quo (conditional) and hostile environment sexual harassment. See infra notes 21-27 and accom-
panying text.
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case basis. Second, several fundamental issues were left unresolved
by the Supreme Court in its 1986 ruling in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson,5 where the Court recognized the claim of sexual harassment
for the first time. Fortunately, however, the Court recently resolved
two major issues relating to the plaintiff's burden in a sexual harass-
ment case.6 First, the Court concluded that the proper standard to be
applied by courts in hostile environment sexual harassment cases is
one encompassing both objective and subjective perspectives. Thus,
courts must consider the viewpoints of both the reasonable person
and the particular victim.7 The Court also concluded that a plaintiff
need not prove that the alleged conduct seriously affected his or her
psychological well-being in order to recover under Title VII.8 By
resolving the issues as it did, the Supreme Court further advanced the
position of those unfortunate persons who have been subjected to sex-
ual harassment.9
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
CAUSE OF ACTION
A. The Recognition of the Claim
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-
fect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.' 0
5. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
6. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
7. Id at 370.
8. Id. at 370-71.
9. Sexual harassment has been defined as "the unwanted imposition of sexual require-
ments in the context of a relationship of unequal power." MAcKiNNON, supra note 1, at 1. This
definition can encompass the harassment of women by men, men by women, or the harassment
of men or women by members of the same sex. This note, however uses the term "sexual harass-
ment" to describe harassment of women by men, unless otherwise noted, because the historically
inferior position of women in the male-dominated work force has resulted in the disproportion-
ate exposure of women to sexual harassment by men. See BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK, ET AL.,
SEx DISCRUMrNAMoN AND THE LAW 192, 195-99 (1975). See also Note, Sexual Harassment
Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under itle VII, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1449 (1984).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
[Vol. 29:761
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The prohibition against discrimination based upon gender was added
to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of Represent-
atives.1' Consequently, there is little legislative history with which to
interpret the full ambit and intended reach of the prohibition of sex
discrimination in employment.' 2
Although the 1964 Civil Rights Act incorporated sex as a basis
for an employment discrimination claim, four of the first five federal
courts that considered sexual harassment claims in the workplace held
that there was no cause of action under Title VII.' 3 These courts pro-
vided several rationales for their conclusions. First, sexual harassment
was deemed to be merely a personal matter. 4 Second, treating sexual
harassment as a claim of sexual discrimination under Title VII would
cause a great increase in the amount of litigation. 5
These concerns, however, were ultimately rejected as impedi-
ments in the way of sexual harassment claims;' 6 appellate courts re-
versed each of the four federal court decisions refusing to recognize
sexual harassment as sexual discrimination within the protection of
Title VII' 7 "Since 1977, all federal courts faced with the issue, have
held that sexual harassment in the workplace may violate Title VII
under certain circumstances."' Following these decisions, however,
11. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577-
84 (1964)).
12. Id. at 64. The principal argument in opposition to the inclusion of sex as a characteristic
in the bill was that sex discrimination was "sufficiently different from other types of discrimina-
tion that it ought to receive separate legislative treatment." Id. at 63-64. This argument in oppo-
sition to the amendment was defeated, and the amended bill quickly passed. Id. at 64. See also
Leo Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTNGs L.i. 305, 310-13 (1968-69).
13. RALPH H. BAXTER, JR. & LYNNm C. HFRMLE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORK-
PLACE 5 (3d ed. 1989). The four cases in which sexual harassment was rejected as a form of
sexual discrimination were: Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J.
1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal.
1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D.
Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Train, 13 F.E.P. Cases 123 (D.D.C.
1974). The one early case to hold otherwise was Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C.
1976), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 587 F.2d 1240 (1978).
14. BAXTER & HEEmLE, supra note 13, at 6.
15. Id.
16. "That sexual harassment does occur to a large and diverse population of women sup-
ports an analysis that it occurs because of their group characteristic, that is, sex. Such a showing
supports an analysis of the abuse as structural, and as such, worth legal attention as sex discrimi-
nation, not just as unfairness between two individuals, which might better be approached
through private law." MAcKiNNON, supra note 1, at 27.
17. BAXrER & HERML, supra note 13, at 8.
18. Id. See, ag., Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd,
749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Seep v. Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.
Ohio 1983); Burns v. Terre Haute Regional Hosp., 581 F. Supp. 1301 (S.D. Ind. 1983); Ferguson
3
McCaslin: Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: Defining the Plaintiff's Burden
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1993
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
questions remained regarding the type of conduct that constituted ac-
tionable sexual harassment.
In 1980, in an effort to aid courts confronted with sexual harass-
ment claims, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) issued guidelines defining sexual harassment and establishing
parameters for behavior in the workplace.' 9 The EEOC determined
that:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual har-
assment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explic-
itly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individ-
ual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an in-
timidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.20
The EEOC recognizes two distinct classes of sexual harassment.
The first and most recognizable is termed quid pro quo harassment
and occurs when an employee must agree to the harasser's sexual de-
mands or forfeit a benefit of or the fact of employment.2 ' Under the
quid pro quo type of harassment there must be evidence of retaliation
on the part of the employer or supervisor, either beneficial or detri-
mental, as a response to an acceptance or denial of the sexual demand
by the employee.22
v. E. I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Del. 1983); Hayden v. Atlanta News-
papers, 534 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645
(E.D. Mich. 1982); Robson v. Eva's Super Mkt., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ohio 1982);
Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Davis v. Bristol
Labs., 26 F.E.P. Cases 1351 (W.D. Okla. 1981); Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp. 123 (W.D.
Tenn. 1981), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1070 (6th Cir. 1984).
19. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993). Within these guidelines, the EEOC advised that
[p]revention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer
should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as
affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate
sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of
harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
Id. § 1604.11(0. Although EEOC guidelines are not binding upon courts, many have deferred to
these guidelines in their efforts to resolve issues in sexual harassment cases. SUSAN M. OMILIAN,
SEXUAL HARAssMENT iN EMPLOYmNT 18-19 (1987).
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993).
21. Id.
22. Although quidpro quo sexual harassment appears to be the more easily identifiable of
the two types recognized by the EEOC, there are certainly questions regarding the determina-
tion of this type of harassment. Three specific situations have been recognized under the quid
pro quo prong of sexual harassment: (1) an employee declines the advances of an employer/
[Vol. 29:761
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The second type of recognized sexual harassment is termed "abu-
sive" or "hostile environment" harassment and is actionable when
harassing conduct occurs that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to al-
ter the employee's work performance or create an abusive working
environment.' In concluding that hostile environment sexual harass-
ment violates Title VII, the EEOC drew upon a substantial body of
judicial decisions holding that Title VII affords employees the right to
work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridi-
cule, and insult.24 "The employment-related detriment that results
from such an environment may be less obvious than the injury caused
by quid pro quo harassment, but it is not necessarily less serious."25 In
fact, because a hostile environment frequently produces a sense of
degradation that often reduces an employee's productivity, this form
of sexual discrimination may reinforce precisely the harmful stereo-
types that Congress designed Title VII to eliminate.26 The EEOC ad-
vised that determinations of sexual harassment should be made on a
case by case basis and only after viewing the record as a whole and
after looking at the totality of the circumstances, "such as the nature
of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred."'27
B. The Supreme Court's Recognition of the Claim: Meritor and Its
Progeny
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
sexual harassment in Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson.' The plain-
tiff in Meritor filed an action against her employer and her supervisor,
alleging that she had been constantly subjected to sexual harassment
supervisor and forfeits an employment opportunity; (2) an employee complies with the sexual
advance and does not receive an employment benefit; and (3) an employee complies and re-
ceives an employment benefit. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 32-40.
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993).
24. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vimson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
25. Note, supra note 9, at 1455.
26. Id.
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1993). See also Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d
1503, 1511 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the totality of the circumstances necessarily includes the
severity, as well as the number, of incidents of harassment).
28. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Meritor was the first case in which the U.S Supreme Court recog-
nized such a claim. Suzanne Egan, Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: 7Ttle Vl Liability for
Sexual Harassment, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L. Rnv. 379 (1987).
1994]
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by her supervisor during her tenure at the bank.29 The plaintiff testi-
fied that shortly after her initial training period, her supervisor sug-
gested that they engage in sexual relations at a motel and that,
although she initially refused, she eventually agreed to have sex with
him and did so between 40 to 50 times out of fear of losing her job."0
She also alleged that her supervisor fondled her in front of other em-
ployees, exposed himself to her in the women's restroom, and forcibly
raped her on several occasions.3' She stated that she never reported
his conduct because she was afraid of him.32 In making its ruling, the
Supreme Court discussed the EEOC Guidelines on sexual harassment
and held that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by
proving that discrimination based upon sex has created a hostile or
abusive work environment. '33
Meritor was important not only because of this formal recognition
of sexual harassment as a form of sexual discrimination, but also be-
cause the Court addressed the more subtle hostile environment prong
of sexual harassment claims. In concluding that a hostile environment
may violate Title VII, the Court relied on both the EEOC Guidelines
and Courts of Appeals decisions. 34 The Court found that the incorpo-
ration of the hostile environment claim in the EEOC Guidelines was
evidence of the developing body of sexual discrimination law.35 The
Court also adopted the holding in Rogers v. EEOC36 where the Fifth
Circuit held that a person may have a Title VII cause of action based
upon a racially discriminatory work environment.3 7 The Supreme
Court analogized the hostile environment racial harassment claim
with a hostile environment sexual harassment claim and concluded
that "[n]othing in Title VII suggests that a hostile environment based
on discriminatory sexual harassment should not be likewise
prohibited. 33
Not all conduct, however, which could be described as harass-
ment necessarily affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment
within the meaning of Title VII.3 9 Consequently, the mere utterance




33. ld. at 66.
34. Egan, supra note 28, at 391.
35. Id.
36. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
37. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66.
38. Id. at 66.
39. Id at 67.
[Vol. 29:761
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of a racial or sexual epithet which creates offensive feelings is not suf-
ficient to violate Title VII.40 Instead, "[f]or sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the con-
ditions of (the victim's) employment and create an abusive working
environment.' ,41 Each incident of harassment is unique; conse-
quently, a determination of sexual harassment must be made in light
of the record as a whole and in light of the totality of the circum-
stances.42 The standard for proving harassment therefore "requires
that a threshold of severity or pervasiveness be exceeded, and also
that the harassment create an 'abusive' and not merely [an] 'offensive'
work environment.
4 3
The Court in Meritor, however, failed to establish several funda-
mental standards to aid lower courts in deciding sexual harassment
cases. Specifically, it did not designate the appropriate standard to be
used in judging allegedly sexually harassing conduct. For example, the
opinion fails to indicate whether conduct should be evaluated by the
reasonable man, reasonable woman, or reasonable person standard. 44
Similarly, the Court failed to state whether conduct should be evalu-
ated from an objective viewpoint or from the subjective viewpoints of
the victim or the harasser. Finally, the Court failed to indicate
whether psychological suffering is a necessary element in a successful
hostile environment sexual harassment claim.45 Lower federal courts
have struggled with these issues and have inevitably reached differing
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. ld. at 69. See also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
43. Peter M. Panken et al., Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Employer Liability for the
Sins of the Wicked, 588 ALI-ABA 201, 215 (1991).
44. For criticism of the Court's failure to establish a standard, see, e.g., Egan, supra note 28,
at 395-401; Colleen M. Davenport, Note, Sexual Harassment Under Title VII: Equality in the
Workplace or Second-Class Status?: Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986), 10
HANMLNE L. REv. 193,216 (1987); Cathleen M. Mogan, Note, Current Hostile Environment Sex-
ual Harassment Law: Time to Stop Defendants From Having Their Cake and Eating it Too, 6
NoTRE DAME J.L. ETmcs AND Put. PoL'Y 543, 550 (1992).
45. Another issue that the Court failed to resolve was that of employer liability for alleged
acts of sexual harassment by either co-workers or supervisors of employees. Although the Court
discussed the concept and potential extent of employer liability, it concluded that "the Court of
Appeals erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual harass-
ment by their supervisors." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. Strict liability is often applied by lower
federal courts to employers in quid pro quo sexual harassment cases based on the principles of
agency and because of the nature of the supervisor's relationship to the victim (as someone with
authority to condition benefits or the fact of employment). Davenport, supra note 44, at 216.
Lower federal courts are divided regarding whether strict liability should be applied in hostile
environment sexual harassment cases or whether knowledge of the supervisor's conduct on the
part of the employer must be shown by the victim in order to recover from the employer. Egan,
supra note 28, at 396 n.149.
1994]
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conclusions." The Harris case arose in this unsettled legal
environment.
III. HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS."
MOVING TOWARD REFINEMENT
A. Statement of the Case
From April 1985 until October 1987, Teresa Harris worked as a
manager at Forklift Systems, Inc. under the direction of Charles
Hardy, Forklift's president.47 Of the six managers employed by Fork-
lift during the period of Harris' employment, four were men and two
were women; the other female manager besides Harris was Hardy's
daughter.48 Throughout Harris' employment at Forklift, Hardy often
insulted her and frequently made her the target of unwanted sexual
innuendos.49 On several occasions, for example, Hardy directed Har-
ris and other female employees to retrieve coins from his front pants
pocket,50 or to pick up objects that he had deliberately thrown to the
ground, thereafter making comments suggesting how the women
should dress to expose their breasts.5' Hardy made sexual innuendos
about Harris' and other women's clothing.5" On several occasions,
Hardy told Harris "you're a woman, what do you know" and "we
need a man as the rental manager. ' 53 Hardy also told Harris on at
least one occasion that she was a "dumb ass woman. '5 4 Hardy addi-
tionally announced on several occasions that Harris had a "racehorse
ass" and told her that "she could not wear a bikini because [her] ass is
so big, if [she] did there would be an eclipse and nobody could get any
sun."55 He also suggested that he and Harris "go to the Holiday Inn
to negotiate Harris' raise. '56 Each of-these comments and suggestions
was made in the presence of others.57
Although Hardy's conduct toward Harris escalated in frequency,
tone, and severity over the course of her employment, Harris initially
46. Mogan, supra note 44, at 550.
47. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (No. 92-1168).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 3-4.
50. Id. at 4-5.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id.
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attempted to ignore Hardy by not talking to him. 8 When the situa-
tion became so unbearable that Harris began experiencing extreme
anxiety, frequent crying, and heavy drinking, she resolved to resign
from Forklift.5 9 Thus, in mid-August 1987, Harris complained to
Hardy about his continuing comments and conduct and told him of
her intention to resign.6" After stating that he was only joking when
he made the comments and gestures and claiming that he was sur-
prised that Harris was offended, Hardy apologized and promised that
he would refrain from such conduct in the future.61 Based on this
assurance, she stayed on the job.62
A few weeks later, however, Hardy began anew.63 While Harris
was arranging a deal with one of Forklift's customers, Hardy asked
her, again in front of other employees, "[w]hat did you do, Teresa,
promise the guy ... (sex) Saturday night."'6 On October 1, Harris
terminated her employment with Forklift.65 Harris subsequently sued
Forklift, claiming that Hardy's conduct created an abusive work envi-
ronment for her because of her gender66 in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.67
B. The Lower Courts' Actions
A magistrate judge for the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee found Harris' allegations to be a "close
case."68 The magistrate found that some of Hardy's comments "of-
fended Harris and would offend the reasonable woman," but con-
cluded that the comments were not so severe as to be expected to
seriously affect her psychological well-being or to cause her to suffer
injury.69 Harris' objections to the magistrate's findings were rejected,
and the court held that Hardy's conduct did not create an abusive
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 7.
60. Id.





66. Id. at 2-3.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(1)(a) (1988).
68. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1993).
69. Id. at 369-70.
1994]
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environment under Title VII.7° The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's decision in an unpublished disposition.71
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the conflict among the circuits on whether conduct, to be actionable as
abusive work environment harassment, must seriously affect an em-
ployee's psychological well-being or lead the employee to suffer
injury.72
The Court reversed the prior rulings against Harris and held that
Title VII does not require concrete psychological harm.73 Instead, the
Court held that the plaintiff's burden is met so long as: (1) a reason-
able person would perceive the environment to be hostile or abusive,
and (2) the particular plaintiff actually perceives the environment to
be hostile or abusive.74 By focusing on what could be perceived by a
reasonable person and what is actually perceived by the employee, the
Court adopted a dual objective/subjective standard for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment cases.75 The "very fact that the discrimi-
natory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work
environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, reli-
gion, or national origin offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace
equality. 76
In determining whether an environment is hostile or abusive, and
thus in violation of Title VII, the Court restated that the fact finder
must consider the totality of the circumstances. 77 Factors in the deter-
rination include: (1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of
70. Id. at 369.
71. l at 370.
72. Id. The Court resolved a conflict among six circuits. Three circuits (the Sixth, Seventh,
and Eleventh) required a showing by the plaintiff in a hostile environment sexual harassment
case that she suffered psychological injury as a result of the allegedly offensive conduct. See
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987);
Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986); Brooms v. Regal Tube, 830 F.2d 1554
(11th Cir. 1987). Three other circuits (Third, Eighth, and Ninth) concluded that a plaintiff need
only show that she has been offended by the defendant's conduct and that a reasonable person
would have been offended by the complained of conduct. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,
895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Bums v. MacGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1992);
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (No. 92-1168).
73. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
74. Id. at 370.
75. Id.
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the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or hu-
miliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.78
However, the Court reaffirmed prior language from Meritor7 9 stating
that the" 'mere utterance of an... epithet which engenders offensive
feelings in a[n] employee' does not sufficiently affect the conditions of
employment to implicate Title VII"'1 On the other hand, the Court
also asserted that "Title VII comes into play before the harassing con-
duct leads to a nervous breakdown."'"
IV. ANALYSIS OF HARRIS v. FORKLIFT Sys., INC.
The Supreme Court's decision in Harris is significant because it
resolved two central issues left unsettled by Meritor.s2 First, the
Court settled the law regarding the appropriate standard or perspec-
tive to be applied in judging alleged sexual harassment. The Court
adopted a dual standard that incorporates both objective and subjec-
tive perspectives. s3 Second, the Court settled a conflict among the
Courts of Appeals by holding that a sexual harassment victim is not
required to prove that she suffered psychological injury as a result of
the alleged sexually harassing conduct. 4 The Court's ruling was
proper regarding both issues.
A. The Reasonableness Standard
The test adopted by the Court is a modified reasonable person
standard which requires proof that the defendant's sexually harassing
conduct created a work environment that would be perceived as hos-
tile both by a reasonable person and by the particular plaintiff. Justice
Scalia states in his concurring opinion in Harris that although the stan-
dards adopted by the Court appear to be vague and unclear, there was
"no alternative to the course the Court... has taken."8 5 Actually, the
Court's adoption of this dual test was by no means automatic and did
78. Id-
79. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
80. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67).
81. Id.
82. The major issue from Meritor left unresolved by Harris was the issue of respondeat
superior employer liability. The Court did not have the opportunity to resolve or even address
the issue of whether an employer is responsible for the actions of its employees in hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment cases in Harris, as the president of the company himself was the
harasser. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
83. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
84. Id. at 371.
85. Id. at 372.
1994]
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not represent a consensus of the Courts of Appeals. In addition to the
modified reasonable person standard adopted by the Court, other
possible standards include the reasonable man, reasonable person,
and the reasonable woman standards. A comparison of these possible
standards indicates that the standard chosen by the Court is the most
well-suited to sexual harassment claims.
The reasonable person standard replaced the traditional, albeit
outdated, reasonable man standard. The reasonable man standard, as
its name suggests, required that conduct be evaluated from the per-
spective of a reasonable male person. Over the past two decades, due
to its gender-bias, the reasonable man standard has been cast aside in
favor of the reasonable person standard, thereby incorporating femi-
nine as well as masculine perspectives.8 6 Incorporation of the femi-
nine as well as masculine perspectives into legal inquiries forces the
trier of fact to consciously consider the circumstances from the van-
tage point of both genders and lessens the likelihood of gender bias.
Many courts apply the reasonable person standard in evaluating alleg-
edly culpable conduct in contexts such as negligence claims.87 Some
courts also applied the reasonable person standard to sexual harass-
ment claims.88
Due to concerns that there are differences in the experiences and
perceptions of men and women regarding sexual harassment, some
courts adopted the reasonable woman standard. These courts inti-
mated that the reasonable person standard is not really gender-neu-
tral. For example, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "a sex-blind
reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to sys-
tematically ignore the experiences of women."8 9 The court justified
86. Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Pierce, The Legal, Ethical, & Social Implications of the
"Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 773,775 n.11
(1993).
87. Id. at 775.
88. See, e.g., Hirschfield v. N.M. Corrections Dept. 916 F.2d 572,580 (10th Cir. 1990); Mor-
gan v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186,193 (1st Cir. 1990); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d
611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986).
89. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). The court noted, however, "where
male employees allege that co-workers engage in conduct which creates a hostile environment,
the appropriate... perspective would be that of a reasonable man." Id. at 879 n.11. Likewise
the Sixth Circuit recently held that a claim exists under Title VII if "working conditions would
have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes" would be
offended. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987). The court followed with:
In a sexual harassment case involving a male supervisor's harassment of a female
subordinate, it seems only reasonable that the person standing in the shoes of the em-
ployee should be 'the reasonable woman' since the plaintiff in this type of case is re-
quired to be a member of a protected class and is by definition female.
[Vol. 29:761
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its adoption of the reasonable woman standard by concluding that,
although many women share differing viewpoints, they also share
common concerns that are not necessarily shared by the majority of
the male population. 90
Despite the strong fairness arguments advanced by some courts
and commentators9' urging adoption of the reasonable woman stan-
dard,' applying such a test raises numerous legal, ethical, and social
questions.93 Probably the most perplexing issue is whether it is fair to
impose liability on men for "well-intentioned behavior that they do
not realize is illegal or offensive." 94 As noted by one commentator it
is possible that "some men who engage in... harassing behavior do so
with neither conscious hostility towards women nor an awareness of
the effect of their conduct .... [These] men would feel personally
wronged by judgments declaring their conduct harassment."' As a
result of such concerns, some courts have refused to adopt the reason-
able woman standard, reasoning that this standard applies the same
Id. at 637. Interestingly in Yates, the Sixth Circuit explicitly followed the dissenting opinion in
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986). See supra note 72. The court did not
overrule Rabidue but distinguished it as a case alleging misconduct by a co-worker, rather than
by a supervisor as in Yates. Eric J. Wallach & Alyse L. Jacobson, "Reasonable Woman" Test
Catches On, NAT'L LJ., July 6, 1992, at 21.
90. The Ninth Circuit asserted that:
many women share common concerns which men do not necessarily share. For exam-
ple, because women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women
have a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. Women who are vic-
tims of mild forms of sexual harassment may understandably worry whether a har-
asser's conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual assault. Men, who are rarely
victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full apprecia-
tion of the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may
perceive.
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the "reasonable woman standard does
not establish a higher level of protection for women than men." Id.
However the court did recognize that under the reasonable woman standard, conduct will
be classified as unlawful sexual harassment even when a harasser does not realize that his con-
duct creates a hostile working environment. Id. at 880. The court justified this possibility by
stating that "Title VII is aimed at the consequences or effects of an employment practice and not
at the ... motivation of co-workers or employers." Id. (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,
239 (5th Cir. 1972)).
91. One commentator has concluded that "Iflor the most part, there is no practical differ-
ence between [the] subjective/ objective approach and the 'reasonable woman' approach. In
both cases, the victim must establish both that she was offended and that a reasonable woman
[person] would be offended." Adler & Pierce, supra note 86, at 776 n.21.
92. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
93. Adler & Pierce, supra note 86, at 802.
94. fi.
95. Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonable-
ness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.i. 1177, 1194 (1990).
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burden to men as was once inflicted upon women when the reason-
able man standard was prevalent.96
Finally, the concerns regarding both the reasonable person and
reasonable woman standards have led some courts to turn to a third
standard, termed either the modified reasonable person standard97 or
the dual objective/subjective test.98 Such a test requires a considera-
tion of both'the perspectives of the particular victim and of a reason-
able person.99 The Harris court adopted this dual standard.
Thus, after Harris, in order prove that Title VII was violated be-
cause of hostile environment sexual harassment, the employee's envi-
ronment must be such that a reasonable person would find it hostile
or abusive and the particular victim must perceive the working envi-
ronment as hostile or abusive.100 As Justice O'Connor stated:
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objec-
tively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title
VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive
the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered
the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII
violation.10'
One possible criticism of the modified reasonable person stan-
dard is that it might stifle legitimate claims by requiring plaintiffs to
jump through "double hoops."" z The plaintiff must now prove not
only that the work environment was hostile to a reasonable person but
also to herself. In practice, the test is, however, not more difficult, and
each element serves an important function.
First, the objective factor is significant because "it is here that the
finder of fact must actually determine whether the work environment
is sexually hostile." 3 This objective element protects the employer
96. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
97. Adler & Pierce, supra note 86, at 776.
98. Mogan, supra note 44, at 565.
99. Adler & Pierce, supra note 86, at 776. See also Brooms v. Regal Ube Co., 881 F.2d 412,
419 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that only if the court concludes that the conduct would adversely
affect the work performance and the well-being of both a reasonable person and the particular
plaintiff bringing the action may it find that the defendant has violated the plaintiff's rights
under Title VII).
100. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
101. Id
102. Mogan, supra note 44, at 565.
103. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990).
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against allegations of the "hypersensitive" employee."' Thus, the ob-
jective factor places an important limitation on sexual harassment
claims.
The subjective element of the test properly accounts for the per-
ceptions of the particular victim. The "subjective factor is crucial be-
cause it demonstrates that the alleged conduct injured this particular
plaintiff giving her a claim for judicial relief."'1 5 Thus, the subjective
factor legitimizes the plaintiff's claim.
The subjective element of the test also aids the plaintiff by caus-
ing persuasive evidence to become more directly relevant. Under an
unmodified reasonable person standard, the particular plaintiff's feel-
ings are not necessarily relevant. Only the perceptions of a reason-
able person are of consequence. Under the subjective prong of the
modified reasonable person standard, however, the plaintiff may in-
troduce evidence about her feelings, reactions, injuries, and other rel-
evant personal evidence.
Furthermore, a sexual harassment plaintiff will not be hard-
pressed to prove that she personally found the advances unwelcome
or the atmosphere hostile.1'6 After all, the plaintiff herself is well-
suited to testify as to her own thoughts and feelings regarding the al-
legedly offensive conduct. The defendant could probably dispute this
testimony only if the employee previously stated either that she was
not offended or that her work environment was not negatively af-
fected by the defendant's conduct.
Furthermore, the trial will typically not be bifurcated as to the
two standards, thereby allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence
concerning each standard during the same trial and to the same
jury.10 7 As a result, all of the evidence may merge in the jury mem-
bers' minds. The likely effect is that evidence which shows that the
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The Court has held that "the fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary,' in the sense
that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual
harassment suit brought under 'Title VII." Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68
(1986). The Court added that the "gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged
sexual advances were 'unwelcome'." Id. Similarly, the Court rejected the view "that the mere
existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled with [the plain-
tiff's] failure to invoke that procedure, must insulate [the defendant] from liability." Id. at 72.
The Court reasoned that when the alleged perpetrator is the plaintiff's supervisor (as in Meritor
and in Harris), "it is not ... surprising that [the plaintiff] failed to invoke the procedure and
report her grievance to him." Id at 73.
107. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. 1992) it is possible that the trier of fact may be a
judge (where equitable relief only is sought or a jury right is waived) or a jury.
1994]
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particular plaintiff was offended will positively affect the jury's deter-
mination of whether both the reasonable person would be offended
and the particular plaintiff was offended.
Consequently, the subjective element of the test is not, in prac-
tice, an added burden that the plaintiff must overcome in order to
recover under Title VII. The converse is true, since the subjective test
specifically gives the plaintiff an opportunity to illustrate the specific,
personal effects of the harasser's conduct. This evidence, in turn, may
also affect the jury's determination of what is objectively reasonable.
Finally, in adopting the modified reasonable person standard, the
Court wisely refused to be influenced by the advocates of the reason-
able woman standard. Although there is merit to the argument that
because women are the likely victims of sexual harassment their per-
ceptions should be considered in evaluating alleged harassing conduct,
the reasonable woman standard puts too great a burden on the male
population. Instead of solving the problem of sexual harassment, the
reasonable woman standard would put men in the same unfortunate
position that women were in when the reasonable man standard was
prevalent in the law. Many men would be forced to evaluate their
own behavior from the perspective of a reasonable woman, which, by
definition, may be impossible. As one commentator has stated, the
reasonable woman standard creates the trap of "discriminating to
avoid discrimination.' 10 8 Instead, the modified reasonable person
standard strikes a proper balance by furthering the goal of a gender-
neutral legal system'0 9 yet still recognizing the personal injuries of sex-
ual harassment victims.
B. Proof of Psychological Suffering
The second conflict resolved in Harris regards the issue of
whether a sexual harassment plaintiff must prove concrete psychologi-
cal harm." 0 The Court concluded that "[s]o long as the environment
would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive,
• ..there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.""'
Justice O'Connor stated that "[c]ertainly Title VII bars conduct that
would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being,
but the statute is not limited to such conduct."1 2
108. Mogan, supra note 44, at 566.
109. Id.
110. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993).
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In making this ruling, the Court expressly rejected the conclu-
sions of several Courts of Appeals, adopting instead the reasoning
advanced by the Ninth Circuit in Ellison v. Brady."3 In Ellison the
court held that the requirement that a plaintiff's psychological well-
being be seriously affected does not follow directly from Meritor."4
Courts that had required a showing of psychological impairment had
misinterpreted the Supreme Court's prior reference to the possible
serious effects of sexual harassment on the psychological stability of
employees." 5 Psychological impairment is a possible result of harass-
ment, but it is not a required element in proving that harassment oc-
curred. In Harris, the Supreme Court adopted the same explanation
for the other circuits' waywardness." 6
In holding that a sexual harassment plaintiff need not prove im-
pairment of her psychological well-being, the Supreme Court contin-
ued its practice of looking to and following the EEOC Guidelines." 7
Under these Guidelines, a plaintiff in a hostile environment sexual
harassment case is not required to prove injury to her psychological
health." 8 Instead, the employee suffers unlawful discrimination
under Title VII when she demonstrates objectionable sex-based con-
duct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere with a reason-
able person's job performance in relation to other employees who are
subjected to such offensive conduct." 9
The Court's resolution of the psychological suffering issue is
proper because the purpose of discrimination statutes should be to
eliminate sexually harassing conduct. In a situation where discrimina-
tory conduct has profoundly affected the conditions of the victim's
employment, Title VII's relief should not be withheld merely because
the victim is emotionally capable of withstanding patently offensive
behavior. Once the plaintiff has established that the environment is
both subjectively and objectively hostile, requiring additional proof of
113. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991)).
114. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
115. Id. at 878 n.8.
116. The Supreme Court stated that "the reference in [Meritor] to environments 'so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability
of minority group workers', ... merely present[s] some especially egregious examples of harass-
ment. [It does] not mark the boundary of what is actionable." Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
117. See Brief for the United States and EEOC at 9-22, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. 114 S. Ct.
367 (1993) (No. 90-1168).
118. Id. at 14-15.
119. Id. at 20. "A sexually demeaning work environment can interfere with a reasonable
[person's] work performance - regardless of [her] psychological injury-if the environment ham-
pers her opportunity to succeed vis-a-vis her male peers or denies her credit for her achieve-
ments." Id. at 25.
1994]
17
McCaslin: Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: Defining the Plaintiff's Burden
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1993
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
psychological suffering places too much focus on the employee's reac-
tion to discrimination rather that on the wrongful actions of the
employer.
Requiring proof of psychological injury confuses the question of
liability with the measurement of damages. Proof of the extent of in-
jury is a prerequisite to a determination of damages in discrimination
cases, but it should not be a prerequisite to finding liability.1 20
Although the existence of psychological impairment is relevant to the
subjective prong of the modified reasonable person standard,1 2 1 its
primary relevance is in a determination of damages after liability has
already established. The practical effect of the Court's resolution of
the psychological suffering issue is to properly reshift this focus.
V. CONCLUSION
Taken together, the Court's separate holdings in Harris create
what can be called a "middle path""a between traditional and novel
ideas regarding the plaintiff's burden in a sexual harassment case.
The Court's decision is indeed a compromise between the extremes of
(1) allowing overly sensitive employees to recover under Title VII and
(2) prohibiting thick-skinned employees from recovering even when
they have faced patently offensive conduct in the workplace. The
Court's decision requires proof of harm yet does not require proof of
psychological destruction.
The consequences resulting from the emergence of women in the
workforce cannot be ignored. Decisions that address the struggles
faced by working women are timely and necessary. Although the law
regarding sexual discrimination will likely never be completely settled,
the Supreme Court has clarified the law considerably in recent years.
The specific ramifications of the Meritor and Harris decisions cannot
yet be known. What is clear, however, is that by confronting the issue
120. Brief for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, et aL. as amici curiae at 11,
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (No. 92-1168).
121. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he effect on the employee's psychological well-being
is, of course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abu-
sive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no
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of sexual harassment and by establishing a workable system for recov-
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